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Wyoming v. Zinke, 871 F.3d 1133 (10th Cir. 2017) 
 
Jaclyn R. Van Natta 
 
In Wyoming v. Zinke, the Bureau of Land Management attempted 
to update a regulation governing hydraulic fracturing from the 1980s, but 
oil and gas industry companies opposed, and brought suit. The district 
court held in favor of the industry petitioners, and the Bureau of Land 
Management and citizen group intervenors appealed. In the wake of 
appeal, Donald J. Trump became President of the United States. The 
administration change caused the Bureau of Land Management to alter its 
position and align with the new administration. Secretary of the Interior, 
Ryan Zinke, via executive order, began rescinding the new fracking 
regulation, which rendered the issues prudentially unripe for review.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the 1940s, hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) has been a vital 
resource to the oil and gas industry.1 Fracking is a technique that allows 
producers to obtain large volumes of oil and natural gas.2 Currently, ninety 
percent of fracking is hydraulic—a hybrid of horizontal drilling and 
traditional fracking.3 Due to increased public concern over fracking 
pollution, the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) published proposed 
Regulation 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-3 (“Fracking Regulation”) on March 11, 
2012 to regulate fracking on “lands owned or held in trust by the United 
States.”4 The Fracking Regulation significantly increased the cost of 
drilling by requiring stricter well construction, testing, flowback 
requirements, and disclosure of chemicals.5 The Fracking Regulation also 
increased BLM’s oversight power.6  
On May 20, 2015, the Independent Petroleum Association  of 
America and Western Energy Alliance (collectively “Industry 
Petitioners”) challenged the legality of the Fracking Regulation under the 
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) on two separate counts.7 Industry 
Petitioners cited the arbitrary and capricious standard and asserted that no 
statute gave the BLM authority to enforce the Fracking Regulation.8 The 
States of Wyoming, Colorado, North Dakota, Utah, and the Ute Indian 
Tribe joined the Industry Petitioners, and opposed the new regulation.9 A 
                                                          
1. Wyoming v. Zinke, 871 F.3d 1133, 1137 (10th Cir. 2017). 
2. Id. 
3. Id.  
4. Id. at 1138. 
5. Id. (See Oil and Gas; Well Stimulation, Including Hydraulic 
Fracturing, on Federal and Indian Lands, 77 Fed. Reg. 27,691-92, (May 11, 2012). 
6. Id. 
7. Id. at 1138-39 (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(A), (C) (2013)). 
8. Id. at 1139. 
9. Id.  
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number of citizen groups intervened (“Citizen Group Intervenors”) in 
support of BLM’s proposed regulation.10 
The district court addressed the issues put forth by the Industry 
Petitioners, supra, and held the BLM violated the APA and exceeded its 
statutory authority.11 The BLM and Citizen Group Intervenors appealed. 
However, while appeals were pending, Donald J. Trump became President 
of the United States and subsequently directed the BLM to abrogate the 
Fracking Regulation.12 The policy shift required the court to first address 
the constitutional question of ripeness before it could reach the underlying 
issues of the case.13 
 
II. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
The Department of Interior (“DOI”) codified Fracking Regulation 
30 C.F.R. Part 221 (“Predecessor Fracking Regulation”) in 1982.14 Under 
the Predecessor Fracking Regulation, the oil and gas industry rarely sought 
fracturing job approval, resulting in minimal BLM regulation.15 In 2005, 
Congress amended the Safe Drinking Water Act (“SDWA”).16 The 
amendment precluded all federal regulation of non-diesel fracking, which 
effectively limited regulation of fracking to state power.17 Despite the 
SDWA amendment—and due to increased public concern—the BLM 
drafted Fracking Regulation 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-3 in 2010, inter alia, 
requiring disclosure of the effects of hydraulic fracking on underground 
water sources.18 Due to the increased regulatory costs the Fracking 
Regulation would have on the oil and gas industry, Industry Petitioners 
objected, stating the BLM’s Fracking Regulation  violated the APA and 
lacked statutory power.19 On March 26, 2015, the BLM published its final 
version of the Fracking Regulation, which would have gone into effect on 
June 24, 2015. However, the district court halted the effective date, 
pending the outcome of Industry Petitioners’ preliminary injunction 
motions.20 
 The BLM and Citizen Group Intervenors appealed the district 
court’s grant of preliminary injunction on September 30, 2015.21 On June 
                                                          
10. Id. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. at 1140. 
13. Id. at 1141. 
14. Id. at 1138. 
15. Id. 
 16. Id.  
17. Id. at 1139-40. 
18. Id. at 1138. 
19. Id. (See 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(A), (C). Post SDWA amendment, the 
statutory provisions of the Federal Land Policy Management Act, the Mineral 
Leasing Act, the Indian Mineral Leasing Act, and Indian Mineral Development Act 
did not provide the BLM any statutory power to promulgate the Fracking 
Regulation).  
20. Id. at 1138-39. 
21. Id. at 1139. 
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21, 2016, the district court entered judgment setting aside the Fracking 
Regulation.22 In the wake of pending appeal, President Trump issued two 
Executive Orders, the first in January 2017 and the second in March 
2017.23 Secretary of the Interior, Ryan Zinke (“Zinke”), proposed 
rescission of the Fracking Regulation, and stated that the Fracking 
Regulation “unnecessarily burden[ed] industry with compliance costs and 
information requirements that [were] duplicative of regulatory programs 
of many states and some tribes.”24  
 On September 21, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit asserted the issue at bar was greater than deciding 
whether a statute existed “provid[ing] the BLM with authority to regulate 
fracking[,]”25 but rather rested upon the question of whether the court 
should proceed on the merits due to ripeness concerns.26 
 
III. ANALYSIS 
 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit first addressed the validity of the procedural process by evaluating 
whether the ripeness doctrine justified its denial to exercise Article III 
power.27 Prudential ripeness was evaluated by dissecting two elements: (1) 
fitness for review by judicial decision and (2) the hardship parties would 
face if the court withheld judicial review.28 Second, the court decided 
whether dismissal or abatement of the appeals was proper.29 Finally, the 
court decided if vacatur was appropriate.30 
 
A. Prudential Ripeness 
 
The court explained that under the prudential ripeness doctrine a 
federal court has jurisdiction, but exercise of jurisdiction would be 
unwise.31 Prudential ripeness was evaluated by assessing fitness of the 
issues for judicial review as well as hardship the parties would recognize 
in the absence of a court decision.32  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
22. Id. at 1140. 
23. Id.  
24. Id. at 1141. 
 25. Id. 
26. Id.  
27. Id.  
28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 1143.  
 30. Id. at 1146. 
31. Id.   
32. Id. at 1141. 
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1.  Fitness for Review 
 
The United States Supreme Court established three factors to 
evaluate whether an issue was fit for review.33 These factors include: (1) 
whether the issues on appeal were purely legal, (2) whether the dispute in 
question was a final agency decision, and (3) whether further factual 
development was needed for the court to make a proper decision.34 The 
tenth circuit recognized two additional factors; (4) whether administrative 
action would be inappropriately impeded by the court’s decision, and (5) 
whether further factual development of the issues in question would be 
beneficial to the court.35 
Factors one and two were met because the issue was purely legal 
and the agency’s decision was final.36 However, factors three, four, and 
five were not met. Since the Fracking Regulation was in the process of 
being rescinded, invalidation of the Fracking Regulation by the district 
court was too dependent on future contingent factors.37 Factor four was 
not met because the BLM was still in the process of rescinding all or part 
of the Fracking Regulation and it would have been inappropriate for the 
court to interfere.38 Finally, factor five was not met because the court 
determined an unusual circumstance existed where “it was better to wait 
until the agency’s regulatory revision was complete.”39  
2. Hardship to the Parties of Withholding Review 
 
Under the hardship analysis, the court focused on harm caused by 
the challenged Fracking Regulation. The court continued its prudential 
ripeness evaluation by determining whether withholding review would 
cause “adverse effects of a strictly legal kind”40 to the Citizen Group 
Intervenors and the BLM.41 To determine hardship, the court assessed 
financial repercussions and innocence of the defendants’ actions regarding 
plaintiffs’ interests.42  
The court held that withholding review would not cause 
hardship—financial or otherwise—upon the parties seeking judicial 
review.43 Withholding judicial review caused the Citizen Group 
Intervenors no further harm than already existed.44 However, where 
                                                          
33. Id.  
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 1142 (See Ferrell-Cooper Min. Co. v. United States Dept. of 
the Int., 728 F.3d 1229, 1234-35 (10th Cir. 2013). 
36. Id. 
37. Id.  
38. Id.  
39. Id. 
40. Id.  
41. Id.  
42. Id. at 1143. 
43. Id. 
 44. Id.  
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withholding review would neither improve nor worsen conditions for 
Citizen Group Intervenors, withholding review proved more beneficial for 
the BLM.45 When the BLM changed position under the Trump 
Administration, the BLM’s desire to repeal the Fracking Regulation made 
withholding judicial review favorable.46 Ultimately, because the court held 
the hardships unsubstantial and the overall issues unfit for judicial review, 
the case was not ripe for review.47 
 
B. Dismissal of Appeal 
 
 The court ultimately held that dismissal of appeal was more 
favorable than abatement.48 The court’s decision was partially a timing 
concern.49 The court would have likely abated the appeal for a short, 
definite period; however, no time limit existed here.50 Further, it was not 
within an Article III court’s role “to supervise or monitor the rulemaking 
efforts of an Article II agency.”51 Ultimately, because the appeal 
challenged the district court’s final judgment instead of a direct judicial 
review of the BLM’s Fracking Regulation, dismissal of appeal was 
favorable.52 Due to the unripe and undeveloped record, coupled with the 
uncertain future of the Fracking Regulation, dismissal rather than 
abatement was appropriate.53  
 
C. Vacatur of District Court’s Order 
 
The next issue the court addressed was whether vacatur of the 
district court’s order was appropriate. Prior precedent said that vacatur was 
generally appropriate when an appeal was moot, and its mootness was not 
caused by the party that sought vacatur.54 The only party seeking vacatur 
in the case at hand was the Conservation Group Intervenors, not Zinke or 
the BLM.55 Further, the court used hypothetical rationalization to 
determine that even if Zinke and the BLM had sought vacatur, evading 
review was not their motive.56 Therefore, the court held that vacatur was 
appropriate.57 The court also held that dismissal of the underlying action 
without prejudice was appropriate because the district court could do no 
more with the prudentially unripe issues than the appellate court.58  
                                                          
45. Id.  
46. Id.  
47. Id.  
48. Id.  
49. Id. at 1144. 
50. Id.  
51. Id.  
52. Id. at 1144-45. 
53. Id. at 1145. 
54. Id.  
55. Id.  
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 1146. 
58. Id. 
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D. Judge Hartz’s Dissent 
 
While agreeing with the majority’s opinion that it would be a 
waste of judicial resources to determine whether the district court erred in 
invalidating the Fracking Regulation, Judge Hartz argued that the majority 
erred on two counts.59 Judge Hartz argued that the majority first erred 
when it vacated the district court’s order because the appellate court lacked 
sufficient information to make such a determination.60 Second, Judge 
Hartz argued that the majority erred when it failed to affirm a partial 
injunction on behalf of the Ute Tribe.61 Because the Ute Tribe’s issues 
went unchallenged by opposing parties, Judge Hartz asserted that a partial 
injunction would have resolved the matter and would not have wasted any 
judicial resources.62 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
Wyoming v. Zinke illustrates that the legal basis for determining 
ripeness is well established: ripeness is evaluated by assessing fitness of 
the issues for judicial review as well as hardship the parties would 
recognize in the absence of a court decision. Nevertheless, if a contingent 
event exists that has yet to occur, such as the BLM’s proposed rescission 
of the Fracking Regulation, a court may, under Article III of the 
Constitution, determine that a claim is not ripe for adjudication. Since it is 
impossible to foresee all possible future contingent events, a natural 
conflict arises. Waiting for all future contingencies to be resolved would 
invariably result in judicial paralysis; however, the rescission of the 
Fracking Regulation by the new administration and Secretary of the 
Interior rendered a prudentially ripe case into an unripe one. Here, the 
court could not hold whether the BLM’s rescission of the Fracking 
Regulation was arbitrary and capricious because the contingent event—
the BLM’s rescission of the Fracking Regulation—was possible, but had 
not yet occurred. Rendering further litigation before the BLM actually 
rescinded the Fracking Regulation would have been a waste of judicial 
resources. 
                                                          
 59. Id.  
 60. Id.  
61. Id. at 1147. 
62. Id. 
